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Bronx County, and defendants appealed. On appeal the Appellate Di·vision unanimously reversed
on the grounds that punitive damages are not available under general maritime law despite
plaintiffs being mere passengers and not seamen or seafarers.
Plaintiffs argued that their status as passengers exempted them from the bar on recovery
of punitive damages under maritime law. However, the court stated that even though the U. S.
Supreme Court in Miles v. ApexMaritime Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317 (1990), only
prohibited such recovery in the case of the wrongful death of a seaman, both Public
Administrator v. Frota Oceanica Brasileira, 222 A.D.2d 32, 635 XY.S.2d 606 (A.D. 1 Dept.
1995) and Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084 (2nd Cir. 1993) upheld the
principle that punitive damages are never available under general maritime law.
In addition, the Appellate Division cited Cochran v. AIH Battery Assoc. , 909 F.Supp. 911,
922 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) where the Supreme Court's decision in Miles was interpreted to mean that
when Congress has passed legislation in a particular area of maritime law courts must conform
with such legislation in fashioning remedies. Therefore, to permit a "punitive damage claim would
be to expand maritime jurisprudence beyond Congress' intention." Further, the court noted that
in Preston v. Frantz, 11 F.3d 357 (2nd Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit said that even if Miles did
not apply to non-seaman, its decision in Wahlstrom acknowledged a "special regard accorded by
admiralty to seaman." The Second Circuit, therefore, recognized that an unacceptable anomaly
would be created if non-seaman could recover punitive damages under admiralty when seaman
were barred from the same recovery by Miles.
Relying on the above, the court held that punitive damages are not available under general
maritime law, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a non-seaman/non-seafarer, and reversed.
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II. Punitive damages not available in maintenance and cure cases

S.M. Pires v. Frota Oceania Brasileira, 659 N.Y. S.2d 25
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The Supreme Court, New York County, entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding
plaintiff with $4 million consequential, $16 million punitive and S 1 million loss of consortium
damages, plus interest and costs. Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed but
modified the award to dismiss claims for punitive and loss of consortium damages and to
dispense with the awarding of costs. The court also remanded the case to the supreme court for
it to consider awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs in light of the dismissal of punitive damages.
The court stated that the strong concern for uniformity m maritime law which was
expressed inMi/es v. Apex Mar. Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317 (1990), bars a plaintiff in a
maintenance and cure case from being awarded punitive or loss of consortium damages. Further,
the court noted that in Public Administrator v. Frota Oceanica Brasrleira, 222 A.D.2d 332, 63 5
N.Y.S.2d 606 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1995) it was held that damages for nonpecuniary loss, including
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punitive damages, are not available under general maritime law. The court then ' dismissed the
balance of defendant-appellant's arguments as being without merit.
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JONES ACT NEG LIGENCE, UNSEAWORTHINESS AND PRIMARY DUTY RULE
Injured seaman claiming Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness defeated summary
judgment motions by presenting evidence showing that his fall into an open hatch may
have been caused b�' unreasonably cramped and slippery working conditions. Primary
Duty rule does not bar seaman's claims when the dangerous condition was not created
by the seaman nor it could be controlled or eliminated by him.

Ribitzki

v.

Canmar Reading

Bates, Ltd. Partnership 1 1 1 F.3rd 658 (9th Cir. 1 997)
(Decided April 1 4, 1 997)
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Seaman Anton Ribitzki ("Ribitzki") was sent by his employer, Piquniq Service Company
("Piquniq"), to work aboard the oil drilling ship CANMAR SSDC ("Canmar"). His job was to
clean the ship's shale pit by hosing away mud and shale after the Canmar finished hole drilling
operations. Ribitzki inj ured himself while walking toward an open hatch as he uncoiled the hose
he used for his cleaning duties. A kink developed in the hose which caused plaintiff to avert his
focus away from the open hatch. He then either slipped or stepped into the open hatch. There
were no witnesses to the accident. Ribitzki suffered serious knee injuries as a result of the mishap
for which he filed a Jones Act negligence claim against his employer, Piquniq, and an
unseaworthiness claim against the vessel and her owners.
The central thrust of plaintiffs claim is that the pitroom where he fell was unreasonably
cramped and slippery for the tasks he was assigned to perform. The pit room measured four-feet
by sixteen-feet in length: the hatch measured two-feet by two-feet, thus leaving two feet of deck
space between the open hatch and pit room bulkhead. In depositions, Ribitzki testified that there
was mud near the hatch area that may have caused him to slip. However, he was not certain
whether he slipped or j ust stepped into the open hatch. Defendants aver that there was no mud
in the pit room on the day plaintiff fell. They further allege that plaintiff was well aware of the
conditions in the pit room and did not exercise proper care in that he should have laid the hose
on the ground and walked to the area where the kink developed.
Under these facts, the district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff on both
actions. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.
I. Jones Act Negligence In its de novo review of the facts, the Ninth Circuit found that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable plaintiff, satisfied all the elements of a Jones Act
claim, namely, duty, breach, notice and causation.
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